Sanctions are a shot in one’s own foot, or as the pro-Putin Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán put it, a shot in one’s own lung; they would only harm Europe and not affect Russia at all; the majority of the people would be against economic sanctions against Russia; they would not end the war either; and anyway, nobody wants to freeze for Ukraine. These are the messages that come daily from politically relevant circles, from the FPÖ to the AfD in Germany, from social democrats and old communists, from vaccine opponents who see a US-orchestrated conspiracy behind every event, from Austrians who believe that neutrality has protected us from all harm, but also from representatives of business organisations – Harald Mahrer, head of the Chamber of Commerce, should be recalled here.

The arguments for rejecting sanctions usually include the increased value of the rouble, price inflation, rising energy costs, the incompetent EU, incompetent politicians in general, and the claim that the USA is the sole beneficiary of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Personnel Problem in Politics

Indeed, one could agree with some of the arguments put forward. The rouble’s value has risen, the euro’s value has fallen, energy costs are increasing, and price inflation is reaching heights not seen in 40 years. Added to this is a policy that made us dependent on Russian gas supplies, usually with the argument that Russia supplied cheap gas and had always been a reliable partner, even during Soviet times. This dependence was further exacerbated after Putin had already used the gas weapon several times, directly against Ukraine and indirectly against European Union countries. Warnings were ignored. Similarly, in European security policy, a course was pursued that massively reduced all military capabilities for defence. On the one hand, to cash in on the peace dividend and funnel money into welfare-state redistribution programmes (voter bribery?), and on the other hand, because it was believed that there would be a warning period of approximately ten years for wars. Yet, even with the annexation of Crimea, experts and politicians were surprised. However, there was still no reaction to the Russian threat. Life was simply too comfortable. And even if one does not want to join the pub-talk sentiment of “all politicians are incompetent”, one must admit that we have a personnel problem in leadership positions across many political levels in Europe.

Jean-Claude Juncker, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, and Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor (from left to right). European policy underestimated Vladimir Putin’s imperialist ambitions for too long.

The COVID-19 policy certainly also played a role in the aversion to ruling politicians. Some mistakes were probably made here, partly because there was no experience at the beginning of the pandemic, leading to drastic measures that have now almost all been reversed. Communication on this was clearly in need of improvement. Clever demagogues and populists naturally tried to capitalise on this mood. A recent study published in Profil showed the parallel between vaccine opponents and those who downplay Russia’s war of annihilation against Ukraine. According to the study, a majority of unvaccinated people blame the USA, NATO, and Europe for this war, not the aggressor Russia.

But are the sanctions really a shot in our own foot? Can they end the war or help to end it? To answer this, one must carefully distinguish several things and clearly define what was intended to be achieved with which measures.

Can Economic Sanctions End the War?

It is clear that economic sanctions will not end a war. It is equally clear that economic sanctions have negative effects on both sides. This is also logical. If one does business, it is because one benefits from it. This applies to both sides. Without a benefit, one would not do the business. If this business ceases, both sides lose something.

This principle also underpins the policy of change through trade. Through steadily increasing trade, trust was supposed to grow between the then-existing Soviet Union and the West. This policy was advocated by social democrats, who also had strong factions within their own ranks that saw (and still see) the goal of their policy in actually existing socialism, and was viewed sceptically and even initially opposed by bourgeois parties. This policy prevailed. In retrospect, this policy also had its successes. The Soviet Union proved to be a reliable supplier of raw materials, even though it remained a totalitarian state until its end.

In 1975, the USSR signed the Helsinki Final Act within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE), which stated: “They (the signatory states, editor’s note) will also respect the right of each other participating State freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural system as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations. Within the framework of international law, all participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect the right of each other participating State to determine and develop its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration as it wishes. They consider that their frontiers, in accordance with international law, can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to alliances; likewise, they have the right to neutrality.”

The non-alignment already agreed upon was then reaffirmed in November 1990 in the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”. Russia, as the successor state to the USSR, later confirmed these agreements.

Change Through Trade and the Interdependence Theory

The policy of change through trade is also based on the so-called interdependence theory. This approach assumes that states become so intertwined in a web of treaties through mutual dependencies (interdependencies) that, firstly, all sides benefit, and secondly, a war between these states would no longer be possible. One of the foundations of this interdependence theory, however, is rational behaviour by political actors. War is expensive and destroys prosperity-enhancing trade relations. Therefore, anyone who acts rationally (sensibly) prefers to trade with their neighbour rather than smash their head in. Because you can no longer trade with a dead neighbour.

The Ukrainians have clearly chosen the European path. They want to finally shake off Moscow’s oppression.

This rational behaviour could evidently be assumed for the totalitarian USSR, but it no longer applies to Vladimir Putin’s rule. Power in the USSR rested on three pillars: the Party, the KGB, and the Red Army. It was a balance of power in which the failure of one rationally acting pillar was supposed to be absorbed by the others. Putin’s Russia, however, is based on a fusion of the KGB, renamed FSB, with organised crime. Russia today is a mafia state where the old KGB officer and later FSB chief Vladimir Putin is simultaneously the boss of all oligarchs who must pay him tribute. The behaviour of this system follows the logic and rationality of criminal organisations: violence to expand one’s own power. In Lenin’s sense, for Putin, gas is the rope with which he will hang the capitalists who previously sold him the rope. Once European states are dependent on Russian gas, and welfare-state-spoiled citizens are accustomed to cheap raw materials, they will torpedo domestic raw material extraction. Indeed, in countries like Germany and Austria, domestic gas production was abandoned with flimsy arguments and special economic interests. There are indications that these groups were supported by Russia. With the gas tap, Putin holds an extremely efficient weapon to spread fear and terror across Europe about a cold winter with every turn of this valve. The term ‘gas war’ has taken on an entirely new meaning.

The question of how economic sanctions work was already addressed by the Paneuropa Movement Austria in April 2015 – the year before, the EU had already decided on some sanctions against Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea – in the “IV. Otto von Habsburg Symposium”. Norbert F. Tofall from the Flossbach von Storch Research Institute then presented studies that clearly show that economic sanctions are not suitable for achieving political goals. This does not mean that sanctions only harm one’s own side. They do indeed have an effect on the sanctioned state. However, political goals must be pursued with political means, and security policy goals with security policy means. (See also the two articles by Norbert F. Tofall in “Paneuropa” 03/2015.)

Boycott of Raw Material Supplies

Opponents of sanctions against Russia usually argue that these sanctions only affect Europe. This is clearly false. Linked to this is the assumption that Putin’s game with the gas tap is a direct consequence of the sanctions against his regime. Politically far-sighted analysts, such as the President of the Paneuropa Movement Austria, Karl von Habsburg, had already demanded in the initial discussions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine that the EU must now respond with a boycott of Russian raw material supplies. The export of raw materials is the main source of income for Russia and thus also the main source of funding for the war.

This demand was based on the assumption that Putin would use the gas weapon anyway. Europe had to pre-empt him by acting quickly, especially given that Putin would turn off the gas tap himself – albeit not entirely. So, whoever acts quickly and decouples quickly will also get out of the dilemma faster. However, even with the much simpler boycott of Russian oil supplies, it became clear that individual states like Hungary or Greece were blocking it and securing circumvention options. While other former Eastern Bloc countries had long taken measures to become independent of Russian supplies, the Orbán government had progressively increased its dependence.

The anticipated decline of the Russian economy is massive.

Putin thus holds the gas weapon in his hand. Every reduction in supply causes the price to rise. Russia can therefore achieve the same, if not higher, revenues from sales to Europe with less supply. Energy experts assume that Russia will not completely stop gas supplies to Europe, at least not in the short term. This is partly because the gas fields from which raw materials for Europe are extracted are not connected to the pipeline network that supplies, for example, China. The infrastructure for this must first be built, which takes time and money. A second reason is technical. Once closed boreholes can only be reopened with great effort, which would be a shot in Russia’s own foot.

Russia’s Dependence

Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian illustrate Russia’s high dependence on the European gas export market in an article for “Foreign Policy” on 22 July.

For example, pipelines to Asia have only ten percent of the capacity of pipelines to Europe. 83 percent of Russia’s gas exports go to Europe, which accounts for 46 percent of the supply in Europe. According to Gazprom data, gas production in Russia has already been reduced by 35 percent. This is just one example of the negative effects of the war on the Russian economy. Regarding gas dependence, it must also be added that the high dependence, which exists in Hungary, Germany, and Austria, for instance, does not affect all countries.

A problem that Sonnenfeld and Tian point out in their article (which in turn is based on the work of numerous other experts and their data analyses) is the availability and credibility of data from Russia. The data supplied by Russia is a “cherry-picking” exercise; the data is incomplete, selective, omits unpleasant facts, or is no longer published at all.

For example, the import of goods plays an important role for the Russian economy, accounting for about 20 percent of GDP. However, this import has collapsed by more than 50 percent in recent months. And it has not been entirely replaced by imports from China and other countries, as some suspect. In addition, there is inflation of between 40 and 60 percent. The sale of Western cars has plummeted by 95 percent. The two authors refer to the looming unemployment due to the withdrawal of Western companies and report an exodus of half a million people, most of whom come from the ranks of highly qualified workers. The authors refute the story of a high budget surplus due to increased energy prices; regarding currency reserves, they point out that Western countries have now frozen approximately 300 billion dollars, which are later to be invested in the reconstruction of Ukraine. According to their analysis, the Russian economy is imploding.

Vladimir Milov also refers to the unreliability of data from Russia in an article for the Slovak think-tank Globsec.

The former Deputy Energy Minister of Russia, economist, opposition politician, advisor to Alexei Navalny, who now works for the Martens Centre for European Studies in Brussels, writes that the concealment of data is indirect evidence of the strong negative effects of sanctions on Russia.

Inflation in Russia

He illustrates how data from Russia is manipulated using inflation. Officially, it was said to be 17 percent in May. However, many reports indicate a significantly higher rate of price increase. And the Russian Central Bank reports an observed inflation of over 25 percent. The observed inflation, in turn, results from opinion polls. According to Milov, the Central Bank has also carried out massive interventions, on a scale not seen since the early 1990s. This means that a true value of the rouble can no longer be determined.

Apart from the short-term effects of sanctions that are already discernible, the medium- and long-term effects are what matter to the economist. Milov writes of the greatest deglobalisation of a major economy in history. Russia will be cut off from international markets, from the financial and service sectors, from technology and logistics. And even the official figures from Rosstat show production declines in various industries of 50 to over 90 percent. For example, minus 60 percent for refrigerators and freezers.

Even the government anticipates a 50 percent decline in imports (in April), while other studies estimate this decline at 70 to 80 percent. In the first quarter of the year, real incomes fell by 1.2 percent year-on-year. These income declines are reportedly increasing, as is unemployment. The nominal strengthening of the rouble, however, has no positive effects on the economy.

The Long-Term Consequences of Sanctions

Vladimir Milov assumes that the truly negative effects on the Russian economy are yet to come. Cut off from the Western world, he believes, no successful economy can be built.

Oleg Vyugin, formerly Deputy Head of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance in Moscow, now active in other areas of the Russian economy, also refers to the long-term effects of the sanctions. In an interview with “Die Presse” (28 July 2022), he states that in the short term, Europe might suffer more. “But in the medium term, looking at 2023 and 2024, Russia will naturally suffer more.” And he also refers to the danger of using the gas weapon. Because by throttling agreed deliveries, other buyers would turn away due to a lack of reliability. “And that is a loss for the Russian economy.”

Only for Inferior Goods

40 percent of the Russian budget depends on revenues from oil and gas exports. These revenues will become even more important in the future because other tax revenues are falling due to the economic decline. Russia can replace some of its trade with the West through trade with China, India, Iran, or possibly Turkey, but not everything, and above all, as Vyugin emphasises, only “for inferior goods”. Oleg Vyugin does not believe that sanctions will be able to end the war.

A forecast on the further economic development in Russia can be read on the European Council’s website, which in turn is based on World Bank studies. According to this, imports will fall by 35 percent, and exports by over 30 percent. For this year, a GDP decline of eleven percent is expected, and an inflation rate of approximately 22 percent.

The aim of EU sanctions is not to directly affect Russian society, which is why, for example, food or health products are exempt. Essentially, the sanctions are designed to directly target Vladimir Putin’s power system. Therefore, the sanctions are directed against areas that are intended to impact the war economy, such as embargoes on high-tech products. And there is a list of individuals from Putin’s power apparatus who are directly affected by the sanctions. This ranges from entry bans into the EU to the freezing of assets in the EU. The European Commission has compiled information material on this on its website.

A problematic aspect of the sanctions is their porousness in some areas. For example, the oil embargo was riddled with many exceptions, from Hungary to Greek tankers. Gas imports are not banned by the EU; here, Putin plays on the fears of many Europeans of a cold winter.

Price Inflation in the EU

The existing price inflation must be separated from the sanctions. Even if the war and the gas game have an impact on price developments in some areas, many other factors are also to blame for the high price inflation. Supply chain problems must be mentioned, as well as, for example, the policy of the European Central Bank, which has long abandoned its legally enshrined mandate of creating monetary stability (inflation target of approximately two percent) in favour of financing the deficits of states. However, the debt levels of individual EU states are not caused by “the EU”, but by these national states, which have long since ceased to adhere to the stability criteria established when the euro was introduced.

For a closer look at this topic, an interview with Professor Thomas Mayer, founding director of the Flossbach von Storch Research Institute, available on the Institute’s YouTube channel, is recommended.

So, are the sanctions actually a shot in our own foot or in our own lung, harming only European countries and not Russia? Undeniably, the sanctions also harm the European economy. A review of which sanctions work and which do not, where loopholes exist, and how they can be closed, is also sensible. Even if the data situation is often inadequate, massive negative effects on Russia are evident, which will increase with the duration of the sanctions. Can the war be ended with economic sanctions? The answer to this question must clearly be no.

Should we therefore lift the existing sanctions and simply wait to see how Russia’s war of annihilation against Ukraine ends? This question can only be answered if the objective is defined. If one wants to expose Ukraine to Russian subjugation, if one wants to simply accept that a despot ignores all rules of international politics, all international obligations entered into by his country, then one can plead for an end to sanctions and indulge in the illusion that one will remain warm. However, the probability that Putin, after a swift conquest of Ukraine (because it is no longer supported and Putin’s imperialism is not reacted to), will contentedly retreat to the Kremlin is significantly lower than the probability that he will then develop an appetite for more, i.e., push the war further west. No reaction to Putin’s crimes would also encourage every despot in the rest of the world to follow suit. It would be an invitation for China to start a war against Taiwan.

You Cannot Do Business with a War Criminal

But if sanctions cannot end the war, and the West supposedly wants peace, why are sanctions necessary? Because you do not do business with a war criminal like Putin and you do not continue to fill his war chest through business. A policy of business as usual would be an invitation to Putin and all other despots to unleash their imperialist fantasies. This would be the end of the free world as we know it, an end to civilised relations between states, an end to international treaties, and the enforcement of the law of the strongest. With all the painful consequences that history shows us.

An action with empty prams was intended to highlight that Russia’s war of annihilation against Ukraine has so far murdered hundreds of children.

That Putin started the war is probably also a consequence of the West’s weak reactions after his war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the beginning of the war in Donbas in 2014. Europe could then, as now, only react with sanctions (which were far too weak at the time), because Europe had dangerously neglected its security policy in the past decades since the end of the Iron Curtain. If military support for Ukraine from most EU countries is hesitant, this is not only a consequence of the political weakness of the leadership personnel but also proof of the inability to defend oneself in the event of an attack.

Austria is probably a negative extreme example here. And even if there were many announcements after 24 February that the armed forces would now be equipped with new gear, that the defence budget would be increased, no measures have yet followed these announcements. There has been no decision to increase the defence budget so far. The only motion adopted in a corresponding session of the National Council was a declaration that barracks should be equipped with solar panels.

From the given facts, one must therefore conclude that while sanctions do not end the war, they are a necessary reaction to the crimes of the Putin regime. Only a strong Ukraine, which thwarts Putin’s conquest plans, will end the war. To this end, the West must continue and intensify its support for Ukraine with military equipment. Europe, in particular, must invest in its own security and security policy.

c Contributory images: European Union 2022 Peter Kohalmi, European Union 2014 Genya Savilov, European Union 2015 Johanna Leguerre, European Union 2022 Francesco Malavolta.

Der Beitrag Sanctions and Illusions erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

Admittedly, Alexander van der Bellen will no longer pass muster as an impartial president of all Austrians. He has remained too silent on the ideologically motivated failures of his radical left party colleagues Zadic, Kogler, and Gewessler. For too long, he has supported the policy of appeasement towards the Russian tyrant Vladimir Putin.

But at least Alexander van der Bellen has finally found clear words on how to deal with Russia. For this, he is now being declared an enemy of the people by a whole host of demagogues who, with their complexes, style themselves as representatives of the people and reap enthusiastic applause from the rabble. The bone of contention is his speech at the opening of the Salzburg Festival, in which he not only clearly stated that we are at a political turning point due to Russia’s war of annihilation against Ukraine (“our future will look different from what most of us had hoped”), but also defended the sanctions, as we cannot accept the right of the stronger (i.e., the aggressor Putin). And he also said the following sentence: “All those who now secretly or quite unashamedly sympathise with Putin’s interests or actually or supposedly collaborate with him endanger our cohesion. We must not allow ourselves to be divided! For this is an ancient despotic practice: Divide et impera! Divide and rule!” (The speech can be read on www.bundespraesident.at.)

From this statement, demagogues are now fabricating the narrative that the Federal President characterised all those who criticise the sanctions as collaborators. Anyone who, beyond the cultural technique of reading, also masters reading comprehension will quickly realise that this narrative of the demagogues is false, meaning they are either intentionally lying or are simply incapable of reading comprehension.

However, anyone who takes a closer look at the type of demagogues spreading this narrative will probably conclude that a considerable portion of these demagogues wish to conceal their own submission – or at least intellectual collaboration – to the Russian narrative of the war of annihilation against Ukraine.

c Featured image: Carina Karlovits/HBF

Der Beitrag Collaborators erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

Reliably available energy is one of the prerequisites for our prosperity. The increasing use of fossil fuels in agriculture after the Second World War was one reason why, for the first time after a major war, there was no massive famine in Europe. Working animals, which had to be fed from the fruits of the fields, could be replaced by machinery.

Even if heating with fossil fuels is increasingly frowned upon today because CO2 is blamed for global warming, one should consider whether we could actually all heat with wood, or whether our forests would not soon be deforested. Intact forests are, incidentally, also a climate stabiliser.

In the sense of the comprehensive national defence anchored in Austria, the reliable supply of energy is part of economic national defence. Access to resources available within the country is a component of this security. The exploitation of a shale gas field in the Weinviertel, which could have covered domestic gas requirements for 30 years, would have prevented many of today’s concerns. However, this was politically blocked by the very coalition that now forms the government in Austria.

Instead, dependence on Russia was driven up through political steering. A dependence of 80 per cent on gas is neither economically sensible nor politically healthy, whatever the motivation of those who brought about this dependence may have been.

Responsibility for this must be clarified. And it is surely appropriate to include those responsible on a sanctions list, just like many others who have promoted the Putin system.

© Featured image: European Union 2021 Aurore Martignoni

Der Beitrag Energy Dependence and Sanctions erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

While there was initial speculation that Putin’s troop deployment might be aimed at annexing the territories in eastern Ukraine already occupied by Russian mercenaries, the current massive assault has made it clear that his objective is the conquest of the entire country. Putin is following a script familiar from previous wars of conquest instigated by dictators driven by fantasies of great-power status.

For this reason, it is to be feared that the further advance of Russian troops will lead to massive purges and the establishment of death camps, whether they be called concentration camps or gulags. If the conquest of the entire Ukraine is not achievable, Putin will in any case attempt to conquer a land bridge to Tiraspol, thereby cutting Ukraine off from access to the Black Sea, and causing as much destruction as possible in the rest of the country.

It is now time for the free world to massively increase sanctions against Russia and to cut the country off from the SWIFT payment system. At the same time, it will be necessary to impose direct sanctions against Putin and his immediate circle responsible for this war. They must be cut off from their assets in Europe and other parts of the free world.

The brutal cynicism with which Putin operates is evidenced by the fact that the war of aggression was launched at a time when Russia holds the presidency of the UN Security Council. This raises the question of whether this Security Council is still capable of acting at all.

An indictment of Putin before the International Criminal Court must be prepared. European intelligence services will also have much work to do in combating the massive disinformation campaigns being spread in all European countries by supporters of the Russian dictator.

In any case, Europe is now well-advised to prepare for a wave of people fleeing the war and to provide unbureaucratic assistance to these victims of Putin’s aggression.

Der Beitrag Putin’s goal is the control of Ukraine erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

What observers have long expected has come to pass. Following a request from the Duma – even warmongering dictators like to cloak themselves in the mantle of pure democracy – Russian President Vladimir Putin has recognised the independence of the two Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and is now officially sending troops into these areas. Anyone familiar with the map of Ukraine knows that these two regions encompass far more than the part of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russian mercenaries. The tactic is familiar from many other Russian acts of aggression (for example, Georgia 2008).

Based on past experience, Putin can naturally expect the free world to react to his war with nothing but empty rhetoric. That would be an invitation for him to let his tanks advance further into Ukraine.

Frantic trips to Moscow by politicians allow the Russian President to use his propaganda media to show the Russian population that their country is a world power once again, and that he, Putin, is the man who has achieved this feat. They all talk to him as they did during the Cold War, when the USSR was also a world power.

The EU is now called upon to prove its capacity to act in foreign policy. This requires targeted sanctions aimed directly at the Russian President and his inner circle, who are responsible for this war. They all have their villas in Europe, their accounts in Western banks, their yachts in Western waters, and their businesses in the free world. They must be cut off from this luxury. Former leading politicians of Western states who work for Russian companies should now have the decency to end their activities for the Putin system.

Ukraine itself is ready to defend itself. However, the country needs support from the EU to do so – specifically military equipment, meaning weapons that enhance its defensive capabilities. For we must be clear about one thing: Ukraine is not only defending its own freedom; it is also defending the freedom of Europe.

Ukraine defends the freedom of Europe

The EU must now prove that it has the capacity to act in foreign policy. By Karl von Habsburg

What observers have long expected has happened. Following a request from the Duma – even dictators like to act as if there were a democracy – Russian President Vladimir Putin recognised the independence of the two Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and is now officially sending troops to these regions. Anyone familiar with the map of Ukraine knows that these two areas mean far more than the part of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russian mercenaries. The tactic is known from many other Russian invasions (e.g. Georgia 2008).

Based on past experience, Putin can of course expect that the free world will only react to his war with empty words. That would be like an invitation to let his tanks advance further into Ukraine.

Frantic political trips to Moscow allow the Russian President, through his propaganda media, to show the Russian people that their country is once again a world power and that he, Putin, is the man who accomplished this feat. They all talk to him like they did during the Cold War, when the USSR was also a world power.

The EU is now called upon to demonstrate its ability to act in foreign policy. This requires targeted sanctions aimed directly at the Russian President and his immediate environment, which is causing this war. They all have their mansions in Europe, their accounts in Western banks, their yachts in Western waters, and their businesses in the free world. They must be cut off from these luxuries. Former Western leaders who work for Russian companies should now have the decency to resign from the Putin system.

Ukraine itself is ready to defend itself. To do this, however, the country needs support from the EU, specifically military equipment, i.e. weapons that increase its defence capability. Because we must be clear about one thing: Ukraine is not only defending its own freedom, it is also defending the freedom of Europe.

© Featured image: OSCE

Der Beitrag Ukraine defends the freedom of Europe erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

Australian wine, once downed with gusto in China, has been made so expensive by punitive tariffs that consumption is plummeting. The trigger? Statements by Australian politicians and media regarding human rights. A Chinese minister declared that the Australian government clearly does not have its press under control. To him, a country that allows its journalists to work freely appears weak and decadent. China, on the other hand—or so he thinks as part of the ruling “new class”—can reject freedom of expression worldwide. Following this pattern, European companies are also punished if they criticise forced labour in Chinese camps. The Swedish fashion group H&M dared to do so. A boycott followed.

It is a pure illusion to assume that we could help the Uyghurs or influence Beijing’s political course through appeals. The recently published book “Drachentanz – Chinas Aufstieg zur Weltmacht” (Dragon Dance – China’s Rise to World Power) by Matthias Naß (C.H.Beck-Verlag) provides an expert description of how China’s inner workings function. The Great Leader Xi Jinping has blended his own ideas with Marxism-Leninism and stylised this mixture into a state religion—or rather, a substitute religion. Mass media and the education system are subject to total political alignment.

Western values could cause Beijing’s system of rule to wobble; they are therefore fought against. Unfortunately, it is useless to denounce this.

Nevertheless, EU politicians tried the impossible. Entry bans followed. Brussels, in turn, reacted with pique and froze negotiations with Beijing on an investment pact. This, however, is a shot in the foot. The European economy needs treaties that protect intellectual property and ensure “more reciprocity in market access” (Merkel). The interests of the EU require us to engage in a dragon dance, enduring China’s exercise of power within its own borders as an internal matter, while simultaneously urging our politicians to negotiate hard with Beijing. The goal must be to accept mutual (!) non-interference in internal affairs and to strengthen the EU economy.

Featured image Shanghai, © EU 2017

Der Beitrag The EU’s Dragon Dance erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

It happened as expected. A month ago, the foreign ministers of the Council of Europe member states had already recommended lifting the sanctions against Russia. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – which, incidentally, traces its origins back to the parliamentary assembly convened by Paneuropa founder Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi – followed this recommendation at the beginning of the week. Simultaneously, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe amended its rules of procedure. Sanctions can no longer be decided independently, but only in conjunction with the Committee of Ministers. The parliamentarians have thus voluntarily placed themselves in a position of dependency on their governments.

Following the military occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, which contravened international law, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stripped the Russian members of their voting rights. This measure was entirely logical given the self-image of the Council of Europe, which sees the upholding of human rights as one of its core focuses. Russia subsequently not only boycotted the sessions but also ceased its payments to the Council of Europe.

With the current decision to yield to pressure from Moscow, the Council of Europe has, firstly, admitted to being susceptible to Russian blackmail. Secondly, it has confirmed the story that my father – citing a conversation with a Russian general – liked to tell about Europe’s behaviour following Russian military aggression against a neighbouring country: first, there will be fierce protest, including rhetorical condemnation. Then, one might even manage to implement soft sanctions. However, it will not be long before business as usual resumes, sanctions are removed, and the Russian conquest is thus accepted.

In this specific case, it took five years to return to business as usual. Moscow, in turn, skilfully exploits the weakness of its partners. Under the cloak of the Council of Europe, individuals who are subject to an EU entry ban due to EU measures will also participate in the assemblies. The fact that the lifting of sanctions throws all the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe and the credibility of European policy overboard seems to trouble the consciences of those parliamentarians who have now given in just as little as it does the foreign ministers.

The fact that the Austrian members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from the ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ also voted for the lifting of sanctions only shows how seriously the talk of human rights and international law is actually taken here.

The article originally appeared on the website of Karl von Habsburg.

Der Beitrag Self-Abandonment erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.

For those who know Iran, there is no doubt that of President Trump’s many disastrous decisions, the withdrawal from the so-called ‘Iran deal’ (JCPOA) is probably one of the most consequential. Even during the negotiations for this agreement, signed in Vienna in 2015, it was repeatedly necessary to remind President Obama’s representatives that Iran is a historically grown, non-Arab, regional great power, and not some backward microstate that can be pushed around at will. Hardly any American today is familiar with the name Mossadegh, a Persian statesman who was removed with the help of the CIA. In Iran, every small child knows the name and the role the USA played in his elimination. An intervention that America (and Great Britain) has not been forgiven for to this day.

In general, Iran is completely misjudged in the West, and most media outlets do not exactly contribute to enlightenment. One gets the impression here that Iran is a theocracy whose main concerns are the suppression of women and the support of terrorist organisations. Who knows that a government committee is currently dealing with the abolition of the compulsory wearing of headscarves? With Saudi Arabia, people go into raptures when women are allowed to get a driving licence. For the women of Iran, such trifles are a matter of course. I do not wish to create the impression that women in Iran have all rights; I only want to highlight the difference in perspective.

Religious veil over totalitarian traits

In terms of its political structure, Iran is a socialist country with communist-totalitarian traits. This includes five-year plans and other anti-economic measures. Over everything lies a religious whitewash that is overvalued in the West. Economic sanctions certainly do not contribute to stability in the Middle East. Of the sanctions to date that hurt the most in Iran following Donald Trump’s termination of the JCPOA agreement, textiles, and thus carpets, are affected. In November, oil and oil products will be added to the sanctions list, followed shortly by the cancellation of the SWIFT agreement. This will mean that communication between European banks and institutions in Iran can be prohibited by the USA, and thus any bank doing business with Iran can be punished by the United States. This also reveals a serious failure on Europe’s part. When the Euro was introduced, there was a failure to introduce a European means of communication and payment system for banks that could function without US control. At the time, it apparently seemed impossible that a situation would ever arise in which the USA and the EU would hold different positions, with the result that the USA suddenly sanctions European banks and companies via SWIFT, even though their business is completely legal under European laws. We will likely see an interesting flourishing of cryptocurrencies and other alternative payment methods over the coming months to compensate for this error. Barter trade will also experience a new boom. Iran has already experienced several decades of sanctions; it knows how to prepare.

The article originally appeared on the website of Karl von Habsburg.

Der Beitrag The other Iran erschien zuerst auf Paneuropa.